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This article explores the case of Deutsche Werkstätten Hellerau (DWH)—a 
furniture and interior manufacturer founded in 1898—through state socialism 
after 1945 and re-privatization in the 1990s. Our analysis suggests that the 
firm’s survival through multiple systemic disruptions was partly due to the 
preservation of a unique identity despite heavy institutional pressures for 
conformity. DWH adopted a “mixed conformity” strategy that attempted to 
pitch multiple concerns (cultural-aesthetic, ideological, economic) of 
political authorities against one another to buffer sociopolitical pressures, 
thus ultimately conforming to some (identity-consistent) demands, while 
violating other (identity-threatening) ones. This allowed DWH to 
successfully navigate tensions between sociopolitical expectations and the 
need to preserve a collective sense of distinctiveness and continuity over time. 
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East German industry faced profound challenges after German reunification in 1990. Practically 
overnight, about twelve thousand companies were thrown into the deep end of capitalist 
competition after forty years of socialist centralized economy, often with outdated machinery and 
production techniques. This led to a scenario in which either the Treuhand—an institution charged 
with administering the nationalized industry and agriculture after the collapse of the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR)—or private investors broke up industrial trusts into smaller 
companies or sold them for parts. The restructuring cost millions of East Germans their jobs, and 
3,718 companies were liquidated. If a company survived, it was often due to the heavy involvement 
of the national or regional government. Only 6 percent of the production capital remained in 
Eastern German ownership.1 
Political change is a particular problem for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
which may lack the financial resources and political clout to survive tectonic shifts in the political 
economy. In the 1,588 cases where it was possible, the Treuhand returned SMEs to previous 
ownership. A number of founder families had left the GDR for the West following socioeconomic 
persecution during Soviet reparation or industrial nationalization campaigns in the 1940s, 1950s, 
and 1970s. Some of these companies—for instance, Zeiss-Opton Optics and the hair-product 
company Wella—had set up new businesses upon arrival in West Germany. After reunification, 
they reclaimed their property and incorporated the re-privatized East German companies into their 
western businesses.2 Others, among them the furniture and interior manufacture specialist 
Deutsche Werkstätten Hellerau (DWH), survived without such personal connections. This 
survival, as the study will show, is largely due to the capacity to preserve a unique identity despite 
heavy institutional pressures to conform in a distinct economic sphere shaped by both commercial 
and political forces: state socialism. 
In the GDR, DWH, like many of its contemporaries, faced a conflict between the need for 
sociopolitical legitimacy and the search for distinction.3 In a market economy, the search for 
distinction is essential in building a profitable position and does not necessarily conflict with 
sociopolitical legitimacy. In a planned economy, by contrast, the survival of a firm depends less 
on its capacity to meet the preferences of a particular segment of the market than on its conformity 
with centralized directives. Planned economies are highly constrained environments that set clear 
rules and regulations for firms, even planning innovation.4 They are also marked by a high degree 
of centralized organization, taking business decisions away from the firm and placing them into 
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the hands of partisan managers, regional administration, and national government. Political 
principles overrule savvy economics, and the regimes reward adherence to the ruling party line 
with access to resources. In these circumstances, as the case of DWH indicates, distinction may be 
maintained only at the expense of endangering political support. 
Twentieth-century Germany offers a unique laboratory for studying the impact of political 
change on firms. Within the span of one hundred years, German companies found themselves 
subjected to radical institutional change, moving from the quickly industrializing Second Empire 
to Weimar’s economically instable democracy, on to the racialized war economy of the Nazi 
dictatorship, and the postwar split into ordo-liberalism in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 
and centralized socialist economy in the GDR. Historians of German big industry, such as 
Siemens, IG Farben, and Thyssen-Krupp, have followed business adaptation processes to varying 
state and economic systems on the level of organizational behavior.5 In comparison, the historical 
SME literature is in its infancy.6 Prominent German business historian Hartmut Berghoff has aptly 
pointed to the merits of including SMEs and family businesses, the so-called Mittelstand, in 
mainstream German economic history.7 Not only do SMEs constitute the vast majority of German 
businesses (depending on the applied definition, 90 percent or more of all German companies), 
but the Mittelstand also embodies the core economic and sociocultural values that the German 
Model is known for: focused long-term business strategies, a high level of specialization, 
concentration on core competences, leadership continuity, highly skilled labor through the dual 
system of vocational training, and a high degree of mutual trust and loyalty between management 
and staff. 
The Mittelstand business DWH, founded by Karl Schmidt in 1898, remained under his 
leadership until 1946, when the Soviet occupation authorities expropriated him and replaced him 
with managing directors, and the company successively integrated into the nationalized planned 
economy.8 Like SMEs in West Germany, DWH had at that point survived three major economic 
crises (hyperinflation, the Great Depression, and the postwar collapse), yet now faced a period of 
dismantlement and reparations unique. DWH was in the eastern zone, so “similar” makes no sense 
here. The implied sense is that the reparations in the East Germany were more expansive than in 
the West Germany, and thus not shared with West German SMEs] in scale and duration to the 
eastern zone of occupation. In the following decades, its obstinate refusal to yield to political 
pressures that, in the eyes of its members, threatened the very identity of the organization had 
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helped the firm preserve technical competences and a distinctive brand that eventually enabled a 
successful transition to a market economy. When reunification came about in 1990, DWH 
successfully emerged from the rubble of the bankrupt GDR economy as one of the global market 
leaders in customized interiors. 
After a brief overview of the foundation and expansion of DWH between 1898 and 1945, 
the article looks at three important phases in the company’s history under East German economic 
development to examine how DWH struggled to maintain its identity while navigating these 
environmental shifts. The phases develop as follows: introduction of socialism, expropriation, 
centralization, and relative isolation from capitalism (restrictive socialism, 1945–1961); increasing 
importance of export trade (opening socialism, 1962–1989); and sudden reintroduction of market 
principles, albeit with state subsidies (managed capitalism, 1990–1996). 
This study, then, places identity processes squarely into their historical context, with 
special attention to the structural particularities of the East German planned economy, and 
contrasts organizational identity with the regime’s guidelines and expectations. It uses historical 
methods to analyze organizational reactions and evaluate results, with an eye not only to 
managerial decision-making, but also to the firm’s relations with the government and political 
stakeholders in the GDR economy. The source base consists of published firm histories and 
archival evidence collected at the Saxony State Archive in Dresden, and the Bundesarchiv and the 
Werkbund Archiv der Dinge in Berlin. It includes correspondence, economic directives, furniture 
designs, and internal company communication. Interviews with former and current company 
management have provided additional insights into the strategic decision-making under political 
pressures and management-employee relationships. 
Our analysis explains how, over the years, DWH managed to cling to its identity—
manifested in a modern product aesthetic, superior craftsmanship and technical skills, and a 
relentless drive to innovate—even when doing so openly challenged governments’ institutional 
pressures, by adopting what we refer to as a mixed-conformity strategy. This strategy was based 
on an ongoing negotiation with political authorities to fend off requests (about, for instance, 
product aesthetics) that—in the eyes of its members—would have threatened the very identity of 
the organization, while highlighting the benefits of its pursued identity for other areas of political 
concern (e.g., efficient production, a steady source of foreign currency). 
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This observation is interesting because it is counterintuitive to longstanding tenets of neo-
institutional theory that traditionally suggest that alignment to institutional pressures favors firms 
in accessing valuable resources, thus achieving sustainability and long-term performance.9 In the 
case of DWH, instead, this strategy enabled the firm to preserve the integrity of the distinctive 
competences and reputation—rooted in its historical identity and heritage—that ultimately enabled 




Organizational identity has become one of the central concepts in the study of how 
organizations evolve and interact with their environment. Albert and Whetten first defined the 
concept in 1985 as those features of an organization—goals, values, competences, and/or 
symbols—that its members claim and believe to be central, distinctive, and enduring about it.10 
Scholars distinguish between organizational identity—as a self-reflective and inherently 
comparative answer to the fundamental question Who are we as an organization?—and 
organizational culture, as a more general set of norms, beliefs, and values that shape how members 
act and interact within the organization.11 While members’ understandings of the organizational 
identity often reflect some cultural elements—typically a set of values that members perceive as 
core and distinctive—not all cultural norms and beliefs contribute to shape their collective sense 
of self.12 At the same time, this collective sense of self may include referents that are not part of 
the organizational culture, such as organizational images, status, social categories, or material 
features.13 
Organizational identity research explores how firms balance conflicting tensions for 
conformity and differentiation in the market, as well as broader questions pertaining to the 
relationship between an organization’s identity and its institutional environment.14 This research 
has shown how identity beliefs and understandings induce members to invest in resources and 
technologies that they see as essential to what the organization is and stands for and to select 
strategies that are consistent with these understandings.15 A stream of consistent choices will 
eventually reflect in external views held by competitors and customers in the form of a corporate 
brand or reputation. In this respect, organizational identity offers a concept that bridges different 
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levels of analysis (individual, organization, market) while accounting for both internal beliefs 
(organization members’ shared values and principles) and external associations.16 
Management scholars have long discussed how identity “is a useful concept for addressing 
managerial choices and dilemmas that may otherwise paralyze the organization.”17 Past studies 
have widely investigated how consensual claims and beliefs about the identity of the organization 
may either promote or delay strategic change, yet research on organizational identity has been 
conducted under the assumption that the institutional, legal, and political environment in which 
the organization operates is relatively stable.18 A question that has so far received only cursory 
attention, however, is how organizational identity interacts with changing political environments. 
In the case of DWH, this question addresses directly what behavior was necessary to strike a 
balance between the need to maintain a sense of continuity and integrity in “who we are” as an 
organization and how DWH organization was perceived externally, while maintaining control over 
the managerial decision-making and ensuring firm survival. From a historical perspective this 
raises an additional question: What were the payoffs of adaptation, and what were the costs of 
differentiation in the socialist economy? We argue that, although it rejected complete assimilation 
in socialism, DWH eventually avoided marginalization through an integrative strategy of “mixed 
conformity,” mobilizing its organizational identity as a resource to navigate the economic 
directives of the centralized planning process, while at the same time striving to preserve its 
integrity. 
 
Deutsche Werkstätten Hellerau: Historical Overview 
 
Deutsche Werkstätten emerged in the midst of the workshop movement at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, a larger cooperative movement in furniture making. Dedicated to eliminating 
the artificial distinction between fine and applied arts, the first Vereinigte Werkstätten für Kunst 
im Handwerk GmbH opened in 1898 in Munich. It attracted leading artists of the Munich 
Jugendstil, who, as Owen Harrod aptly observes, “working in collaboration and often, effectively, 
in friendly rivalry, would reinvent the German interior.”19 That same year, cabinetmaker Karl 
Schmidt (1873–1948) founded the Dresdner Werkstätten in Hellerau near Dresden, Saxony, on a 
much smaller scale with a loan of three thousand marks. The company grew quickly by 
incorporating similar businesses in the vicinity, eventually joining forces with the Werkstätten 
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company in Munich under the new name of Deutsche Werkstätten für Handwerkskunst GmbH, 
Dresden und München in 1907. At that time the company counted 250 employees. It eventually 
incorporated in 1913. A network of company-owned retail stores in Dresden, Munich, Hamburg, 
Berlin, Cologne, Frankfurt, and Vienna as well as connections to global distributors allowed 
Deutsche Werkstätten to spread its interpretation of modernity around the globe. 
Schmidt successfully developed a cohesive organizational identity around his own core 
principles: quality materials, honest construction, progressive traditionalism, craftsmanship, and 
education of specialized workers. Respect for materials became a key part of his entrepreneurial 
vision. By developing innovative and resourceful ways of using materials, DWH came to represent 
ideas about conservationism and environmental responsibility inherent in modernism.20 Schmidt 
described the company’s social purpose in 1899: “On the one hand we want to create rich and 
refined room interiors in a modern style only, on the other also room furnishings, furniture, and 
ornament for the middle class, which are not dependent on empty appearances and do not imitate 
the rich and splendid with inappropriate means in a unreliable way.”21 DWH’s vision integrated 
neatly with the turn-of-the-century applied arts movements, which protested a quickly 
industrializing production culture that brought forward shoddy or kitschy products. DWH based 
its organizational identity on truthful aesthetic style and honest production values.22 To reach a 
sublime convergence of social responsibility and modern vision, the company cooperated with 
some of the most gifted visionary architects and designers of the time: Richard Riemerschmid, 
Bruno Paul, Heinrich Tessenow, and many more who followed. 
In its first decade, the company’s name became increasingly associated with so-called 
Maschinenmöbel, a label that indicated the mechanized mode of production and typefication—the 
term is often falsely translated into English as “standardization.”23 Aesthetically, the furniture 
design by Riemerschmid invoked arts and crafts principles, such as honesty in construction and 
truth to materials. Decorative elements connecting the components reminded the onlooker of the 
modern construction of such machines as locomotives or steamships. This connection came quite 
naturally for the company; from 1902 onwards, it procured contracts not only for naval interiors 
for the expanding German navy, but also for passenger ships.24 
Riemerschmid’s designs were followed by Bruno Paul’s famous Typenmöbel line in 1908. 
Distilled and idealized references to Biedermeier neoclassicism joined with sobering, typified 
furniture elements on an evolutionary path to modernist timelessness.25 In its second decade, the 
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company developed furniture programs that, in scale and popularity, rivaled those of market 
leaders and won the company prestigious prizes at international crafts fairs and world 
expositions.26 The middle class quickly bought into the vision of efficient modernity that this 
serially produced, yet hand-finished, furniture promised. Items were suited for mass production 
while a vast range of pieces and finishes allowed for individualization, maintaining the level of 
culture that contemporary applied arts discourse expected, and typefication became DWH’s golden 
ticket to industrial modernity. 
After World War I, the company developed its aesthetics alongside interwar modernist 
movements that introduced New Objectivity (Neue Sachlichkeit) and continued the increasingly 
abstract references to the Biedermeier era. Ornamental elements faded into the background, while 
practical simplicity came to dominate. In 1925, the company developed its first prefabricated house 
for a middle-class clientele, preceding by two years the famed Weißenhofsiedlung exhibition, 
where renowned architects such as Le Corbusier tackled modern housing challenges in similar 
ways. At the dawn of World War II, then, the visionary founder and the designers, architects, and 
craftsmen with whom Schmidt surrounded himself had propelled DWH to the forefront of the 
modernist movement. The fact that few companies outside the Werkstätten movement were able 
to provide quality modern furniture for house and garden, let alone the house itself, at middle-class 
prices, Harrod argues, shows that DWH was more influential than the Bauhaus avant-garde in 
modernizing mainstream domestic culture in Germany and beyond.27 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The next evolutionary step in DWH’s production culture came with Adolf Schenk’s 
furniture line Billige Wohnung in 1927. Void of ornamentation and with simple finishing, 
customized production lines reduced handwork to a minimum. The assembly-line typed 
mechanization offered the opportunity to produce efficiently in bulk, rendering the furniture 
affordable to the middle class. While craftsmanship took a back seat to technological innovation 
with Billige Wohnung, the company’s commitment to quality materials remained intact; for 
instance, the elegant chairs were made of solid oak. Using the same principles for mass production, 
yet less austere in its aesthetic, the 1935 Wachsende Wohnung line continued the concepts of both 
Paul’s typefication and Schenk’s mass production designs (Figure 1). The modularity of add-on 
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furniture allowed customers to start with a small investment, adding pieces with growing fortunes, 
and bound them to the company over a longer period. With simple aesthetics, restrained usage of 
raw materials, and affordable furniture for the middle classes, DWH production culture fit in with 
Third Reich social and economic policy. 
 
Marginalization under Restrictive Socialism, 1945–1961 
 
At the end of the war, Dresden came under Soviet occupation and, as a wartime producer 
of military equipment—among others, airplane parts and parts of the infamous V-2 weapon—
DWH fell under the Allied demilitarization policy. Between July and November 1945, Germany’s 
most modern furniture production facilities and machines underwent complete dismantling; even 
lamps and lightbulbs were shipped to the Soviet Union.28 Afterward, the remaining staff started 
rebuilding business with repair services and the production of small-use items, such as chairs and 
wooden boxes, slowly equipping the stripped company with machinery and tools. Amid a changing 
political climate, Walter Heyn, who had joined DWH in 1924 and been member of its board of 
directors since the mid-1930s, fled to the West, where he founded the Deutsche Werkstätten 
Fertigungsgesellschaft in Hamburg (later relocated to Munich).29 Soon thereafter, the Soviet 
Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) dissolved the Deutsche Werkstätten Hellerau GmbH 
and expropriated Schmidt and his partners in 1946. In 1951, GDR economic policy converted 
DWH into a nationalized business (Volkseigener Betrieb [VEB]), which de facto established full 
state control over the company.30 Like the majority of East German companies, DWH delivered 
war reparations to the Soviet Union until 1953. 
A source that allows insight into the company’s struggle to stay true to its founder’s vision 
after nationalization is an unpublished booklet from 1953, Möbel und Innenräume (Furniture and 
interiors). The booklet pictures a number of DWH designs as solutions to the problem of furnishing 
public buildings during GDR reconstruction.31 The first secretary of the Socialist Unity Party 
(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands [SED]) Central Committee, Walter Ulbricht, stopped 
the booklet’s publication on grounds that the depicted DWH furniture contradicted the new cultural 
guidelines issued by the Bauakademie, the central agency responsible for construction in the 
GDR.32 Ulbricht’s criticisms were in keeping with the dominant cultural discourse of the time. In 
July 1950 at the Third Party Congress, the SED had announced a cultural reorientation to align 
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with the Soviet Union. A German interpretation of cultural Stalinism, a mixture of realist and 
folklore elements, was to find application in all artistic areas including literature, film, architecture, 
and the applied arts.33 Following this announcement, politicians and practitioners engaged in a 
dispute, the so-called Formalism Debate (ca. 1950–1953), over the aesthetics of German socialism. 
Eventually, the political leadership silenced former Bauhaus members and other disciples of 
German interwar modernism who had pleaded for functional aesthetics—one of the pillars of 
DWH’s approach to furniture design. Henceforth, companies whose production range was based 
on the applied arts, such as DWH, were put under pressure to produce in the historicist, heavily 
ornamented style to represent German cultural heritage and to turn to mass production to support 
the reconstruction effort. 
The DWH company board—composed of long-term employees, including the technical 
director Erich Menzel—and director Friedrich Wurzler decided to reject the “suggestions” of 
political authorities.34 They elected instead to pursue a strategy that would allow DWH’s expert 
knowledge of materials and processing technologies, gained over multiple decades of vocational 
training and innovation, to find application in special designs for public buildings and to continue 
small serial production of exemplar modern furniture.35 Menzel, for instance, helped to develop 
an innovative technology for a veneer wood press, which pressed layers of veneer into solid shapes, 
and applied it to a newly designed steam-shaped wood seminar chair (see Figure 2). The design 
for the chair was inspired by the metal industry, where shaping had minimized wastage and 
production time. Applied to the wood industries, where cutting, planning, and milling usually 
produced waste, this cutting-edge technology, when applied to wood materials with the required 
elasticity, resulted in more than double the number of chairs per cubic meter of material (130 chairs 
versus only 56 chairs when using carpentry techniques).36 The seminar chairs eventually were 
mass-produced by another company to satisfy the large demand.37 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
The achieved conservation of raw materials and labor met the requirements of the socialist 
centralized economy in an exemplary fashion, yet the modern style of the simple three-joined 
shaped-piece chair did not follow the new official ornamented style. Notwithstanding the aesthetic 
discrepancies, DWH’s in-house architect Selman Selmanagić pointed out that the division of 
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labor—i.e., the development of exemplary furniture pieces by a market leader, such as DWH, 
outsourced for mass production to specialized facilities—achieved a sublime synergy between 
socialist economics and quality design. In line with the founder’s original vision of honest 
production and responsible modern living, Selmanagić argued in 1953 that this strategy would be 
“the best way to provide workers with comfortable, functional, beautiful, and, most importantly, 
affordable furniture.”38 Selmanagić was a Bauhaus-educated architect and member of the KPD 
(Communist Party of Germany) underground during the Third Reich who, since the end of World 
War II, also collaborated with DWH in projects he oversaw as the newly appointed director for 
cultural and recreational buildings in the Office for Urban Planning of Greater Berlin. He had the 
political credentials to be critical, at least between the lines, of the regime’s economic and cultural 
policies without having to fear personal persecution.39 
This attempt to mobilize DWH’s identity and reputation for socially conscious production 
ethics to respond to the pressures of the political leadership was the company’s first documented 
attempt at “mixed conformity.” We use this term to refer to a strategy for sociopolitical 
legitimation that attempted to address some concerns of political actors in exchange for the 
allowance to transgress other requirements—such as, in this case, product aesthetics—, conformity 
to which would have threatened the organization’s sense of distinctiveness and continuity. The 
company, then, made a counteroffer, showing an alternative way to combine its strength with the 
political vision for the new East German state. 
The initiative backfired, however, and DWH became the target of abuse and public 
defamation spread in the media. Retail stores, probably ordered from above, boycotted DWH 
furniture.40 The national retail organization (Handelsorganisation [HO]), which had taken over the 
company’s domestic retail structures, now refrained from selling DWH products—not for 
technical or economic reasons, but because of their divergence from governmental policies.41 The 
Council of Ministers—that is, the GDR government—codified the new socialist aesthetic in a 
resolution about “the new tasks in interior design and furniture industry” on January 21, 1954. At 
the heels of the January 1954 resolution came the introduction of so-called E-Stellen, short for 
Entwicklungsstellen, centralized product development departments manned by state-approved 
architects and designers. DWH’s production manager Kant led the local E-Stelle, where he was 
required to implement central orders from the Bauakademie.42 Nevertheless, in a stern refusal to 
abandon is traditional ways, DWH continued the practice of working with renowned modern 
  12 
architects and designers, such as Selmanagić and Franz Ehrlich. Moreover, the company 
unofficially rekindled collaborative relations with architects residing in the Federal Republic.43 
Product aesthetics, then, had become the site of much broader identity struggle, as DWH’s attempts 
to preserve its organizational identity clashed with the new government’s efforts to reshape the 
national one. DWH’s recalcitrant attitude toward the centralized organization of the design process 
eventually resulted in a lack of sociopolitical legitimacy, which endangered company survival. 
Eventually, and timidly, the company began to manufacture according to the new stylistic 
requirements implemented by the Bauakademie.44 Yet, among employees, the identification with and 
loyalty to the firm and its modern aesthetic was deep-seated. After new designs conforming to policy 
had been put on display for the company’s workers to critique in April 1954, an internal report noted 
that, generally speaking, staff still raved about modern furniture and rejected the state-prescribed 
ornamentations on profiles and bases.45 It is thus clear that the fulfillment of cultural norms in the GDR 
was highly problematic for DWH leadership and workers, who still identified with the modern product 
range that the company was known for. Pride stood in the way of fully submitting to the official cultural 
diktat. By the end of the year, Kant had summed up the sentiment: “Our artistic collaborators and the 
product development department are trying to develop furniture in reference to the cultural heritage, 
yet only under the foundational consideration of modern living. The aim of this development has to be 
maintaining, or rather regaining, the good domestic culture of Deutsche Werkstätten.”46 
Walking this fine line between assimilation and rejection became increasingly problematic in 
DWH’s relationship with the Bauakademie and its director, Jacob Jordan. As the chairman for furniture 
on the GDR Artistic Advisory Board, Jordan had veto power over all designs in the national furniture 
industry. In a so-called Aussprache, a meeting to “talk things out,” Jordan met with DWH’s 
management and its freelance designers in December 1954. The minutes of the conversation show how 
he criticized each DWH piece in regards to its functional, material, and aesthetic value under the new 
cultural policy maxim. He likened some of the sample furniture to “bourgeois” Third Reich designs 
produced by an alleged Nazi supporter in Berlin, “the elegant furniture store Reiner on 
Kurfürstendamm,” thus ideologically questioning and stigmatizing DWH’s identity. Finally, Jordan 
accused the company of cheap showmanship (Effekthascherei) with “formalist” designs. Könitzer, 
head of the national light industry coordination unit for wood products, supported Jordan’s point of 
view, which enraged Selmanagić, who had then just joined the conversation. Selmanagić disputed the 
artistic board’s right to an opinion on the aesthetics of DWH furniture, because in his eyes the members 
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were lacking the necessary professional qualifications. He openly accused the Bauakademie of playing 
power politics, puppeteering the artistic board, and attempting to sabotage DWH in order to dominate 
GDR domestic culture. Engaging Selmanagić, Könitzer threatened that he would use his connections 
to the Central Committee against him and the company: “First and foremost, comrade Ulbricht 
personally will take care that Deutsche Werkstätten can never again build such boxes [solche Kisten].” 
Mutual attacks and accusations of being class enemies escalated the already heated exchange until 
Könitzer left in the middle of the conversation and Jordan adopted a more pacifying tone.47 
With a line drawn in the sand, it was evident after this meeting at the end of 1954 that the GDR 
leadership and the economic apparatus opposed DWH as a rival for the leadership in East German 
domestic culture. Company director Wurzler drew the obvious conclusions from the official threats 
and the sabotage that the company had experienced at the hand of retail and economic management. 
Wurzler fled to the Federal Republic in 1955, where he took over one of the West German Deutsche 
Werkstätten businesses in Munich. After his departure, Erich Menzel, a longtime employee, member 
of the board, and DWH technical director since the late 1940s, moved into the position of managing 
director and secured a certain degree of continuity in the company’s production culture. 
The targeted attacks on DWH only added to other structural changes that affected its business 
strategy fundamentally. Economic centralization, which reorganized the furniture industry in 
horizontally and vertically organized local industrial trusts, or combines (Kombinate), from the late 
1950s onward, put further restraints on DWH’s independence, as strategic planning increasingly moved 
outside the company. In 1958, VEBs such as DWH were further integrated within their district through 
the Association of Nationalized Companies (Vereinigung Volkseigener Betriebe [VVB]), at first a 
purely administrative body created to coordinate the diverse ownership forms in the furniture 
industry.48 The state erratically expropriated and nationalized privately owned industry in successive 
waves—the last expropriations happened in 1972.49 This deepening of integration added another layer 
of bureaucracy that managed capacity coordination, specialization, and standardization, yet also further 
hampered independent product development and increased pressures for conformity.50 
 
Integration into Opening Socialism, 1961–1989 
 
By the end of the 1950s, then, DWH had maneuvered itself into a situation where insistence 
on its history and heritage, and its determination to stay true to its traditional product aesthetic in 
  14 
the face of adversary circumstances, had become an existential risk. Under Menzel’s leadership 
from 1955 onward (see Table 1), the company acquiesced to the overwhelming demands of the 
centralized planning and organization of industry as a survival technique. Nevertheless, the 
company kept two lifelines that connected it to its original organizational identity: export and 
innovation. 
As early as 1957, DWH design garnered attention in the West, not least thanks to its own 
connections established at the Leipzig Fair and efforts to contact West German firms.51 The 
company explored opportunities for direct representation in the West, to a certain degree 
circumventing the usual protocol: the central organization of the export trade via the East German 
trade board (Deutscher Innen- und Außenhandel [DIA]).52 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
However, in the hostile Cold War environment of the late 1950s, commercial activity in 
the FRG carried risks for DWH. For instance, in 1960, the West German Deutsche Werkstätten in 
Munich, Hamburg, and Cologne—former sister companies—opposed DWH’s participation in the 
most important furniture fair in the West, the Internationale Möbelmesse (IMM) in Cologne. 
Maintaining that they were the rightful successors in title to the Deutsche Werkstätten brand, they 
threatened to sue for de-recognition of DWH’s branding as a Werkstätten company. The VVB 
Möbel deemed this a real legal threat and recommended that DWH exhibit under the names of its 
suppliers and subcontractors. Rather than giving up on the brand and its identity, DWH withdrew 
from fair participation.53 The West German Werkstätten companies’ rejection, however, gave 
DWH the impetus to explore western markets beyond the FRG. The same year, it received small 
orders and requests for sample pieces from London and established an increasingly successful 
collaboration with British distributors.54 Proactive customer acquisition was part of the company’s 
strategy to have at least a limited level of control over the kinds of furniture it would be asked to 
produce. 
In 1963, Ulbricht’s New System of Economic Planning and Management (NES), which 
was followed by the slightly adjusted Economic System of Socialism (ESS; 1967–1970), 
introduced limited market principles to counter a decade and a half of mismanagement in the light 
and consumer industries. It also acknowledged the limits of socialist economic thinking at a 
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moment when the GDR wanted to reenter the world market, after a period of extreme isolation 
following the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and allowed firms more independence.55 
Export trade became increasingly significant to procure the foreign currency necessary to 
modernize East Germany’s capital stock. DWH’s export contacts enabled the company to 
ameliorate its relationship with the state. Despite the hostilities DWH had encountered in 1960, it 
reemployed the Werkstätten brand and worked hard for export to West Germany. The western 
Werkstätten, particularly those in Munich and Frankfurt, eventually opened up to cooperation in 
1966, under the condition that they would exclusively represent DWH furniture in the Federal 
Republic.56 
Adaptation to western tastes was paramount if the GDR furniture industry wanted to 
become competitive in western Europe. At this moment, DWH’s noncompliance with the E-Stellen 
policy, contrary to most East German furniture companies, and continued practice of working with 
renowned designers turned into a clear advantage. Market research showed that modular wall units 
for the living room—shelving systems capable of integrating a range of elements, such as glass 
cabinets, a bar, a desk, or even seating or sleeping furniture—had become very successful on the 
West German market. This so-called Schrankwand furniture had almost completely pushed serial 
furniture sets out of the market. Known for its expertise in modular furniture, DWH received the 
official commission to develop a model that would meet the requirements of the western export 
markets, as well as those of the GDR domestic furniture market, and fit in the small prefab 
apartments of East Germany’s housing program. The resulting shelving system, Möbelprogramm 
Deutsche Werkstätten (MDW), designed by architect Rudolf Horn in 1967, became a success.57 
MDW’s modular design could easily be mass-produced and, with its board construction, 
incurred comparatively low storage and transport costs, which also made it ideal for export. With 
this modular furniture program, DWH connected to the tradition and spirit of Bruno Paul’s 1935 
Wachsende Wohnung design, which substituted serial furniture sets with singular pieces that could 
be added on.58 Yet the quality of the materials that the VVB and the Bauakademie provided was 
low: subpar varnishes and finishes as well as low-quality plastic fittings and mountings. Instead of 
wooden veneers at this time the woodworking industries used paper foils with wood grain prints, 
which were then finished with varnishes that created the appearance of polished wood. For DWH 
this meant that it was impossible to keep up its usual quality standards. Nevertheless, MDW was 
in high demand in Sweden, where the company sold a thousand Schrankwände in 1972 alone.59 
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Multiple redesigns in the 1970s and 1980s guaranteed the longevity of MDW’s success story. It 
remained in production until the collapse of the GDR in 1990. 
Although Ulbricht’s economic program ultimately failed in 1970, export to the West 
remained an integral part of GDR economic policy, because it was the only way to accrue foreign 
currency for much-needed raw materials and machinery to modernize and rationalize production. 
This found expression in yet another centralization in 1970, which created ever-larger combines 
that eventually replaced the VVB structures.60 The VE Kombinat Dresden-Hellerau—a newly 
formed regional industrial trust of twenty-five furniture producers and suppliers, including 
approximately 12,000 workers in Saxony—with DWH as its core company became one of the 
largest and most influential furniture trusts in the GDR.61 Between 1960 and 1985 the volume of 
furniture export from the GDR to the FRG increased from DM 4.7 million to DM 257.8 million, 
temporarily accounting for more than 50 percent of GDR furniture exports overall. At the height 
of GDR furniture exports, between 1979 and 1983, it comprised 17.1 percent of all consumer 
product exports.62 This impressive performance came thanks to a range of different economic 
planning and administrative stimulation measures, such as massive investments in new 
technologies, focus on key markets, increase in storage capacities, and the shortening of model 
life-spans in so-called export promotion companies (Exportförderbetriebe), among them DWH 
beginning in August 1974.63 It is at this point that DWH had fully redeemed itself vis-à-vis the 
SED regime through its export success. The company thus continued the strategy of mixed 
conformity by following the push to develop inexpensive mass-produced furniture, while at the 
same time retaining its own distinctive aesthetic. No longer was it under pressure from the political 
leadership to conform to official design doctrine; rather, it was invested with trust in leading the 
GDR furniture industry out of a backward-looking aesthetic and into the future of a conservative 
modernism that was gaining the upper hand in western Europe. 
With MDW the company at last gave in to the pressure from economic authorities to focus 
on mass production. Yet that is not the entire picture. In fact, DWH sustained a department for 
interior customization, the Sonderfertigungsabteilung Innenausbau, throughout the existence of 
the GDR. The Sonderfertigungsabteilung was where specialized woodworking techniques, 
research, and innovation continued. For a few years, the political leadership’s blacklisting of the 
company had hampered the initial specialization on larger public building projects. However, after 
the course changed in the 1960s, DWH once more gained important contracts for customizing 
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building interiors. Most prominent among the projects were the interiors of the Hotel Unter den 
Linden in Berlin (1966), the Kulturpalast in Dresden (1969; Figure 3), the concert hall 
Gewandhaus in Leipzig (1980–1981), and the Semperoper in Dresden (1985–1986).64 
Furthermore, the Sonderfertigungsabteilung successfully procured contracts in the West. Most of 
the jobs abroad were in southern West Germany, where DWH customized interiors, such as the 
Nibelungenhotel in Worms, and office buildings.65 The Sonderfertigungsabteilung staff usually 
completed the projects in situ, a travel privilege that allowed the company to develop knowledge 
about western standards and technology. 
With the Sonderfertigungsabteilung and the investments received as an 
Exportförderbetrieb, DWH had more access to higher quality materials and modern woodworking 
technology than other companies in the industry at a time when ill-managed five-year plans 
hampered progress and severely outdated machinery stock in the GDR. Yet still DWH could not 
service projects where the client was unable to deliver specific materials or advanced technology 
to the GDR. For instance, the company had to decline a request from a western design office to 
produce sample furniture for the 1989 IMM Cologne furniture fair, “not because of the carpentry 
work, but because of the surface technology and the necessary materials. The wooden boards 
available in the GDR are not suitable for the [requested] direct application of varnishes.”66 After 
forty years of planned economy, DWH existed in an outdated and underequipped industrial 
context, yet the company continued to be competitive and known for its technical expertise and 
woodworking knowledge in the European market. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Assimilation into Managed Capitalism, 1990–1996 
 
Reunification completely altered the context for East German industries. Overnight, an 
economic system that had not required individual companies to make strategic decisions or 
necessitate risk-taking turned into a highly competitive, market-driven economy. For the second 
time in less than fifty years, East German businesses encountered radical systemic change. 
Privatization began at the eve of the economic and monetary unity on July 1, 1990, when the VE 
Kombinat Dresden-Hellerau and its twenty-two thousand employees split up into twenty-five 
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constituent firms, which were turned into seventy-four independent GmbH iA. With the 
introduction of the deutsche mark in the summer of 1990 the price of GDR products rose, resulting 
in a negative trend in aggregate demand for East German goods.67 In particular, it pushed low-end 
furniture production into a midlevel price range, costing companies like DWH their 
competitiveness on the international market. As European socialism continued to crumble over the 
next year, supply systems for critical materials and components within the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (Comecon) fell apart. And lastly, the Comecon export market collapsed, 
robbing the GDR furniture industry of the last market in which to sell its goods.68 However, the 
collapse of these economic structures, which from the beginning had reflected political constraints 
rather than economic logic, also offered an opportunity for companies like DWH: free export 
market choice and the freedom to specialize production to allow for economies of scale. No longer 
able to rely on favorable cost conditions, however, these companies had to find a differentiated 
position in their respective markets. 
The industrial restructuring was overseen by the Treuhand, a government agency entrusted 
with administrating the denationalization process in the territory of the former GDR.69 Over the 
years, the agency has received harsh criticism for lack of transparency, corruption, job depletion, 
and misuse of funds for unsuccessful restructurings. With the outdated production infrastructure—
during the first half of the 1980s aggregate investment in East Germany had dropped sharply, 
further exacerbating the deterioration of machinery—departments that operated economically 
obsolete capital needed to be shut down, and politically motivated product lines had to be 
terminated.70 However grim the bottom line of increasing unemployment numbers, approximately 
one-fourth of the twelve thousand small firms previously nationalized were transferred back to the 
original owners.71 Of course, this was not possible in the case of DWH because Schmidt had died 
in 1948, shortly after the expropriation. Former company director Werner Kreische followed 
requests by DWH employees that he lead through the privatization phase, and the Treuhand 
employed him until investors were found.72 All that differentiated DWH from others was a 
valuable firm identity based on core competencies that had survived the egalitarianism of state 
socialism. 
In fact, the Treuhand recommended the company as an “altes Traditionsunternehmen”—a 
company with a long tradition—to Fritz Straub, a West German manager with experience in the 
pharmaceutical industry, among others Hoechst, who was interested in investing in the former 
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GDR. After having seen some sixty companies over the span of six months, most of which Straub 
remembers as “depressing” and full of “despaired employees,” he stopped in his tracks when he 
walked past the Sonderfertigungsabteilung at DWH.73 The stubborn refusal of the company 
management to betray their organizational identity and conform to political directives had salvaged 
a core set of skills and a production culture—along with a legacy of products and a meaningful 
brand—that could now be put to new valuable uses. 
Together with three other investors, Straub built a restructuring plan around this 
department, specializing in customized interior carpentry, which the Treuhand accepted. Of 809 
employees at the point of privatization in late June 1990, only 264 remained by the end of 
September 1992 when Straub and his partners took over the company. In return for DM 10 million 
in financial aid (the so-called Anschubsfinanzierung), the investors had to guarantee the jobs of 
eighty-five employees—among them seventy highly skilled carpenters—and the training of forty 
apprentices for the next three years.74 The management decided to concentrate on high-quality 
workmanship. Based on the structural economic considerations laid out above and the low-quality 
furniture that DWH built at the time—in spite of post-1990 efforts to modernize machinery and 
update furniture designs under Kreische’s leadership—the decision was made to move away from 
its long history as a serial furniture producer, as this approach no longer seemed tenable in the new 
competitive landscape.75 The new strategy, then, selectively tapped into the pool of competences 
and brand associations that had endured multiple disruptions as successive generations of 
managers and workers had clung to what they believed characterized the company—even when it 
had meant dangerously challenging political authorities. It did so by refocusing on elements that 
the new manager saw as having the potential to distinguish the company in the current market 
conditions. It should be mentioned that it is not uncommon for acquisitions to result in the new 
management introducing changes that threaten and undermine the identity of the organization, 
generating tensions and resistance, often at the expense of commercial performance.76 By contrast, 
the case of DWH exemplifies how new management may successfully restructure an acquired 
company around a plan that is respectful of both its identity and its heritage and leverages 
longstanding competences and brand associations. 
With the expertise of the Sonderfertigungsabteilung Innenausbau and the highly skilled 
workforce that remained after the takeover, DWH focused on integrating into the western economy 
by drawing on its legacy in customized interiors. With privatization in 1992, DWH received 
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contracts for customized ship interiors, building on the tradition during the heyday of German 
shipbuilding in the Second Empire when the company’s clients had included the German navy, 
HAPAG, and Norddeutsche Lloyd.77 This time around, the first contracts came from the 
restoration of eight historical Elbe steamships for the White Fleet, followed by the building of two 
decks of two new Elbe liners. Collaborations with freelance designers and architects remained a 
key to DWH’s success in interior customization. But more importantly, the company’s propensity 
for product development gained new importance. The creation of a new department, the “Project 
Workshop” in 1995, institutionalized this expertise. 
It soon became clear that if DWH wanted to be competitive beyond eastern Germany, it 
needed to expand its repertoire beyond woodworking, and in the late 1990s the company began to 
hire engineers to begin working with modern interior design materials, such as glass, metal, 
plastics, and rock.78 Proximity to research centers, like the Technical University in Dresden, 
allowed the company to build expert knowledge, and most of today’s 250 employees are engineers, 
with the number of carpenters stable at 70. Expert knowledge is central to the success of the 
company. With an unusually high participation rate in the apprentice scheme—about 10 percent 
of the company’s employees in the early 2000s—DWH continued its tradition of recognizing that 
a highly competent workforce is a competitive advantage.79 
The company itself ascribed its success in a completely new situation for both the western 
management and the eastern workforce—“without financial help, without clever consultants, 
without the helping hands of the government”—to brand recognition and its focus on core 
competencies.80 Under Straub’s leadership, and as a sign of respect for what the founder had 
created in Hellerau, the company recovered Schmidt’s legacy as a marketing anchoring device—
the embodiment of the core values of the firm—and a means to inscribe the company into German 
economic history.81 DWH has made a name for itself as one of the foremost interior building 
companies worldwide and is contracted for the interiors of luxury yachts, hotels, and residences. 
The preservation of its core ideals and distinctive competencies enabled the company to survive 
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DWH offers a well-documented case study enabling history and business scholars alike to 
examine how organizations maintain a sense of continuity and distinctiveness in the face of 
institutional and environmental shifts—such as those introduced by the radically changing political 
and economic systems in Germany—that demanded changes that threaten the identity of the 
organization. 
Our study makes three distinct contributions. From a historical perspective, it offers 
value in illuminating part of a history that we know little about: the organizational behavior of 
companies under state socialism. Literature on businesses in the socialist economy had 
heretofore highlighted the negative effect of state planning on innovation, tested the value of 
path-dependency in explaining company development, and followed German firms across the 
shocks of political and economic system change. Often the emphasis has been on state policy, 
yet our study indicates that we can learn more about managerial decision-making and the 
relationship between managers and political authorities under socialism by examining 
struggles over conformity and differentiation, as companies attempted to reconcile political 
demands and an imperative to act in continuity with their identity and tradition. 
DWH’s story is one of conflict between the company’s own identity and institutional 
pressures for aesthetic, ideological, and economic conformity under state socialism. Tracing 
the company’s behavior across fifty years, what emerges is a pattern of mixed conformity as a 
delaying tactic to navigate these pressures while exploring alternative solutions. This strategy 
recognizes the multiple concerns of sociopolitical actors (cultural-aesthetic, ideological, 
economic) and tries to pitch one against the other to buffer sociopolitical pressures by 
conforming to some (identity-consistent) demands, while violating other (identity-threatening) 
ones. By addressing some political concerns, DWH strove to preserve a degree of sociopolitical 
legitimacy while also attempting to escape official requirements that would jeopardize the very 
identity of the organization. Shifting priorities of the regime helped this strategy to succeed 
until a new systemic change relaxed political pressures entirely. At that time, by having 
relentlessly pursued the preservation of organizational identity in the face of pressures to 
conform, DWH had maintained a core set of competences and a culture that ultimately ensured 
its survival after re-privatization, as its history and aesthetic legacy became an important 
resource in building a new future. 
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Had DWH given in completely to the sociopolitical and cultural pressures during the 
first centralization in the 1950s and to the standardization efforts in the 1960s, the company 
likely would have collapsed along with, or shortly after, the socialist system. Instead, holding 
on to its modern aesthetic and investing in the Sonderfertigungsabteilung, the company 
preserved knowledge (e.g., superior craftsmanship skills and the capacity to produce tailor-
made solutions) and a strong brand that allowed it to reposition itself toward interior 
customization after the collapse of the GDR in a way that maintained continuity with its 
organizational past and let the company reclaim the legacy of its founder. 
This observation is novel and important because it challenges current beliefs in 
institutional theory: namely, that lack of conformity and sociopolitical legitimacy will 
ultimately deprive an organization of the resources and/or latitude of action it needs to survive. 
It points instead to a viable strategy, available to organizations confronting a complex set of 
sociopolitical demands and expectations, to extract themselves from pressures to modify 
features that would threaten their very identity, by conforming to others that are better aligned 
with the organizations’ historical trajectories and future plans. 
Further, our analysis illustrates how the tension between sociopolitical pressures to 
conform and organizational identity may offer an impulse to the entrepreneurial search for new 
avenues for growth and development in other fields and markets, as organizational members 
try to keep their distinctive identity despite the lack of conformity—an identity-pushed 
innovation path of sorts. This observation is important because it points to identity not only as 
an inertial force—inducing resistance to changes that threaten what the organization is and 
stands for—but also as a generative force, energizing members to search for innovative 
solutions that enable them to preserve the integrity of a collective sense of self when hard-
pressed to relinquish distinctive organizational features. 
Finally, this study makes a novel contribution to business history, by bringing 
organizational identity theory to bear on historical analysis. What emerges is a fruitful 
explanatory lens for historical change that is able to forge productive analytical connections 
between different micro-organizational and macroeconomic levels. It allows us to see how a 
strong organizational identity helps to preserve distinctive competences and reputation in the 
face of environmental pressures for adaptation, ensuring a company’s long-term survival 
through repeated political disruptions. 
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